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CONFESSIONS AND THE COURT
Stephen J. Schu/hofer*

POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW
AND POLICY. By Yale Kamisar. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1980. Pp. xx, 323. $17.50.
Collected in this volume are seven essays and law review articles,
spanning sixteen eventful years of evolution, revolution, retrenchment, and just plain chaos in the jurisprudence of police interrogation. Presented with scarcely any updating of text or references, 1 and
with no overview of trends or themes, the book provides an easy
target for the kinds of criticism that can be leveled at any collection
of this sort. If anything, this collection is more vulnerable than most,
because only two or three of the articles can be said to take a general
problem in confessions as their starting point.2 Three of the others
are commentaries on individual cases, with meticulous attention to
particularities of the record or to opinions filed in concurrence and
dissent; 3 two articles are tributes to the work of colleagues;4 and one
article still bears the marks of its origins in the lowly book review
* Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1964,
Princeton University; LL.B. 1967, Harvard University. - Ed.
I. Kamisar deleted the portions of one pre-Miranda article that discussed the implications
of Escobedo, and made additions to eight out of well over a thousand end notes and footnotes.
See Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS viii, xii (1980) [hereinafter cited
as KAMISAR EsSAYS without cross-reference].
2. Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions ofAmerican Criminal Procedure (originally
published in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 11 (A. Howard ed. 1965)), in KAMISAR EsSAYS
at 27, addresses the fundamentals directly and with a breadth of vision matched by few articles
in the field. What is an 'Involuntary' Confession? (originally published at 17 RUTGERS L. REV.
728 (1963)), in KAMISAR EssAYS at I, provocatively explores the title question against the
background of the law enforcement manual, F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS 0962). The article began as a book review, p. xi, and much ofit is devoted
to a close critique of lnbau and Reid's tendentious statement of the law. Brewer v. Williams,
Massiah and Miranda: What is ''Interrogation"? When .Does it Matter? [hereinafter cited as
What is Interrogation?] (originally published at 67 GEO. L.J. I (1978)), in KAMISAR EssAYS at
139, is heavily rooted in the facts and opinions in Williams, though it proceeds well beyond
them.
3. A .Dissent from the Miranda .Dissents (originally published at 65 MICH. L. REV. 55
(1966)), in KAMISAR EssAYS at 41; Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a .Discomfiting Record (originally published at 66 GEO. L.J. 209 (1977)), in KAMISAR EssAYS at 113; What is
Interrogation?, supra note 2, in KAMISAR EssAYS at 139.
4. Kauper's "Judicial Examination ofthe Accused" Forty Years Loter (originally published
at 73 MICH. L. REV. 15 (1974)), in KAMISAR EsSAYS at 77; Fred E. lnbau: "The Importance of
Being Guilty" (originally published at 68 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 182 (1977)), in KAMISAR
EsSAYS at 95.
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genre. 5
This unlikely mixture of ingredients nonetheless makes for a
bubbling and thoroughly captivating brew. Each topic, however tied
to events of the moment, triggers an explosion of questions, hypotheticals, analyses, and insights. Forgotten dissenting opinions
and never-noticed details of trial testimony lead to larger problems
that are anything but dated or obscure. The discussion constantly
probes not just for "policy arguments" but for thefacts, the raw facts
underlying the polite abstractions. The articles survey the pros and
cons but then let you know where the author stands, usually in no
uncertain terms, and often in language that glows white hot with an
indignation made more compelling by Kamisar's obvious awareness
of countervailing arguments and his graciousness (usually) to the individuals who advance them. Along the way we find countless refreshing sidelights and anecdotes, a mini-history of the academic
debates over police interrogation, and in effect, the intellectual autobiography of the person who, despite his generous praise for the contributions of others, 6 was himself a leading force in the Miranda
"revolution" of the 1960s.
A book so rich, so full of life, will not easily bear a summary,
seriatim, of its constituent parts. It provides a mine of information,
stimulation, and insight that will have countless different uses for
students and teachers, lawyers and judges, reformers and scholars.
For me it prompted many questions about how and why the various
confessions doctrines have developed to their present point, how well
those doctrines satisfy the diverse demands that are properly imposed upon them, and how the constraints of the judicial function
have affected and should affect the evolving content of the overall
package of doctrinal principles. What follows are some thoughts on
these matters suggested by Kamisar's immensely stimulating work.

I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON POLICE
INTERROGATION

Three independent constitutional doctrines have played a role in
limiting police interrogation and related prosecution efforts to obtain
incriminating information from suspects: the due process clause
5. What is an "Involuntary" Coefession?, in KAMISAR EsSAYS at l; see note 2 supra,
6. Kamisar lauds Bernard Weisberg for drawing attention to the interrogation manuals
that proved so influential in Escobedo and Miranda, pp. 62 n.19, 109-10; he credits Claude
Sowle with inspiring his own truly inspired Gatehouses and Mansions article, pp. 106-07, 256
n.62; and attributes much of Miranda's conceptual foundation to the "magnificent" American
Civil Liberties Union brief authored by Anthony Amsterdam and Paul Mishkin, pp. 49 n.11,
109, 163 n.30.
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(with its associated requirement of "voluntariness"); the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination (with its associated Miranda safeguards); and the sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel.7 I will consider these in tum.
A.

The .Due Process "Voluntariness" Test

In a series of cases beginning in 1936,8 the Supreme Court held
that the admission in a state criminal trial of an "involuntary" confession violates due process. The early cases required exclusion of
such confessions primarily (and perhaps exclusively) because of their
unreliability, but as the course of adjudication proceeded, it became
clear that confessions would be held "involuntary" and hence inadmissible, even when their reliability was clearly established. Indeed
in 1961, in Rogers v. Richmond,9 the Supreme Court held that a court
assessing a voluntariness claim could not even tonsider the fact that
the police tactics would not tend to produce a false confession. 10 The
Court did not, however, get very far in its efforts to articulate precisely what factors did render a confession involuntary or what policies supported the exclusion of involuntary confessions. The
opinions condemned "overbearing the will," as revealed by "the totality of the circumstances." They justified the condemnation as a
response to "fundamental unfairness" 11 or because "ours is . . . not
an inquisitorial system." 12 There was virtually nothing more to go
on. In 1961, Justice Frankfurter, in an ambitious attempt to lay bare
the fundamentals, identified two competing policies: first, that
"questioning suspects is indispensable to law enforcement" and thus
"whatever reasonable means are needed to make the questioning effective must be conceded to the police"; 13 but second, that "the terri7. One other doctrine, the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, has lurked in the background of cases involving the use of secret agents and surreptitious recording to obtain information. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), does not
entirely settle the constitutionality of such tactics, because the plurality opinion in White, in
holding justified the imposition of a risk of betrayal, relies heavily on the possibility that if a
defendant "sufficiently doubts [a companion's] trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize." 401 U.S. at 752. It seems far from clear whether this reasoning
can fairly be extended to custodial situations in which a secret agent is posing as a defendant's
cell mate. q: United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1346 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding eavesdropping, without consent of either party, but only under circumstances reasonably necessary
for maintaining prison security), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978). Fourth amendment
problems related to confessions are not addressed by Kamisar and will not be pursued here.
8. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
9. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
10. 365 U.S. at 543-44.
I 1. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
12. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
13. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 578-79 (1961) (plurality opinion).
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ble engine of the criminal law is not to be used to overreach
individuals who stand helpless against it . . . . [M]en are not to be
exploited for the information necessary to condemn them . . . ." 14
He described the voluntariness test as an effort to strike a balance
between these two opposite "poles." 15
Kamisar's first interrogation article, What Is an Involuntary Confession?, exposes the contradictions underlying Frankfurter's approach and calls for a new departure. Drawing on police
interrogation manuals. Kamisar sketches a vivid picture of the interrogation techniques recommended by responsible police educators
and of the sophisticated theories of psychological manipulation underlying those techniques. He makes clear that "reasonable means
. . . to make the questioning effective" and "overreach[ing] individuals who stand helpless" are not opposite poles but more often "intersecting circles":
If the police may tear suspects from their homes, friends and neighbors, put them in an "interrogation room" without informing them of
their right to keep silent, and shut out the "outside," they can "exploit"
suspects for information "necessary to condemn them," can they not?
. . . Evidently an uncounselled, uninformed suspect all alone in an
interrogation room is not deemed "helpless" . . . . At what point is he
rendered "helpless" or "exploitable?" [Pp. 13-14.]

Using a brilliant four-part hypothetical (pp. 15-20), Kamisar
shows that the old voluntariness terminology, with its focus on
"breaking the will," was not only unhelpful but misleading. He
demonstrates that neither of the two critical concerns - the offensiveness of the police behavior and the tendency of the interrogation
methods to produce a false confession - had focused or should focus primarily on the subjective mental condition of the particular
defendant. The essay does not attempt to sketch all the answers but
instead ends with a call for discarding the obfuscating language of
voluntariness and starting to address the underlying concerns more
directly.
Events quickly overtook efforts to sharpen the old due process
test, and when Kamisar returned to the subject in later essays his
objective was not so much to explicate the due process test as to show
its elusiveness and its inherent unworkability. In a scathing attack
on the opinions filed by the dissenters in Miranda (pp. 41-76),
Kamisar invites us to ponder their claim that the voluntariness standard represented "a workable and effective means of dealing with
14. 367 U.S. at 581.
15. 367 U.S. at 578, 581.
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confessions in a judicial manner." 16 His review of cases decided
under that standard before Miranda, his selection of the dissenters'
own earlier characterizations of the standard ("elusive, measureless," 17 "uncertain" and "unpredictable," 18 "we do not shape the
conduct of local police one whit" 19), and his telling statistics about
the realities of Supreme Court review (very few confessions issues
won Supreme Court consideration in noncapital cases, and even in
capital cases only one out of four petitioners was granted a hearing
(p. 75), serve to expose the central premise of the dissenters' argument as altogether unconvincing if not mildly ridiculous.
Adding up the diverse strands of criticism developed by Kamisar
and others, one finds roughly six defects in the due process voluntariness test:
I. The standard left police without needed guidance. Because of
its vagueness and its insistence on assessing "the totality of the circumstances," the voluntariness standard gave no guidance to police
officers seeking to ascertain what questioning tactics they could use.
Indeed, at the critical point when the police sensed that a suspect was
about to "crack," they were enjoined to be on guard against both
"overbearing the will" and losing their chance by lessening the tension or pressure; in many common situations the message of the due
process test was not just vague but inherently contradictory. Under
these circumstances, moreover, exclusion of improperly obtained
confessions was an unsatisfactory remedy: the defendant's physical
or psychological injury was not redressed, the exclusion did virtually
nothing to deter similar police abuses in the future, and society lost
the benefit of a statement that might have been obtained anyway had
the police been forewarned to avoid the tactics eventually ruled improper.20
2. The standard impaired the e.ffectiveness and the legitimacy of
judicial review. The vagueness of the voluntariness test spawned several interrelated difficulties for the courts. Not only were conscientious trial judges left without guidance for resolving confession
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also 384
U.S. at 503 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting) (advocating a "totality of the circumstances"
test of voluntariness).
17. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 455 (1961) (Clark, J., dissenting).
18. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring).
19. 347 U.S. at 139 (Clark, J., concurring).
20. But see Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), where a confession obtained after
police kicked and threatened a suspect was held admissible on the ground that the police
conduct was not a causal factor triggering the confession. Cf. Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368
Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975) (severe coercion did not taint a subsequent confession), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 969 (1976). See note 52 infra.
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claims but they were virtually invited to give weight to their subjective preferences when performing the elusive task of balancing.
Judges unsympathetic to constitutional values, or concerned about
the release of a dangerous offender, might not adhere to the evolving
constitutional standard. Appellate courts theoretically could correct
erroneous trial court judgments, but similar attitudes inclined many
appellate judges to permit interrogation tactics that should have
been condemned under applicable Supreme Court precedent. There
was ample evidence that such disregard of established principles was
serious and pervasive.21 Effective appellate control therefore required either active Supreme Court review - an impossibility in our
judicial system - or active intervention by federal courts granting
habeas corpus - a technique that was inhibited to a degree by the
same subjective attitudes and that was unhealthy for the federal system when it worked.22
In any event, inadequate judicial sensitivity to constitutional
rights was not the most fundamental part of the problem. The ambiguity of the due process test and its subtle mixture of factual and
legal elements discouraged active review even by the most conscientious appellate judges. Moreover, when higher courts did attempt to
address confessions questions, they found themselves so wholly at
sea that the appearance of principled judicial decision-making inevitably suffered, whether or not they chose to hold the confession inadmissible. The Supreme Court, which has special reasons to guard
the objectivity and perceived legitimacy of its processes, was particularly vulnerable to institutional damage on this ground. 23 The damage simply could not be contained by Justice Frankfurter's eloquent
insistence that the ad hoc due process approach was nothing but a
"disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science."24 Had the
Court' been willing to hear more confessions cases, the threat to its
legitimacy and prestige probably would have been aggravated by the
very actions that were at the same time necessary to exert more effective control over the lower courts.
3. Application of the standard wasfatally dependent upon resolution of "the swearing contest. " Even if the content of the voluntari21. See Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 806-08 (1970).
22. q: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 n.5 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that state courts are charged with front-line responsibility for enforcing constitutional
rights).
23. See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in J)ue Process Adjudication - A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE LJ. 319 (1957).
24. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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ness test had been more precise, its application would remain
dependent on fact-finding about events that inevitably occurred in
secret, with the suspect isolated and often disoriented, distraught, or
confused. At trial, there was little to prevent police from describing
the interrogation in terms consciously or unconsciously slanted to
favor admissibility of the confession. The defendant could do little
more than present his version, leaving it to the judge or jury to decide the relative credibility of the two sides to this "swearing contest." And there was next to nothing to prevent judges and juries
from systematically resolving credibility isssues in favor of the police. Indeed, it was likely that any fact-finder, no matter how skeptical of police testimony, would tend to credit that testimony over the
claims of a suspect whose perceptions probably were not acute,
whose incentive to fabricate was even stronger than that of the police, and whose ability to supply corroborating facts was usually nil.
Under these circumstances no one could know whether the "facts"
evaluated in court corresponded to the events that actually had occurred in the interrogation room. 25
4. Considerable interrogation pressure was allowed. Although
the amount of pressure to confess tolerated by the courts seemed to
be steadily diminishing, the voluntariness test clearly did authorize
considerable pressure. Indeed, the conception of voluntariness indirectly encouraged police to pressure suspects because it viewed police efforts to persuade a reticent suspect to talk as legitimate and
highly desirable. 26 Of course, defenders of the voluntariness test did
not regard this particular feature as a defect. But for those who supported the principle of the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and who failed to see why "compulsion"
within the meaning of the privilege should be narrowly defined as a
formal, legal obligation to speak, the allowance of substantial police
pressure under the voluntariness test was anomalous and wrong. 27
5. The weak were manipulated The voluntariness test ostensibly took account of special weaknesses of the person interrogated,
but because it did permit the use of substantial pressures, suspects
who were ignorant of their rights, unsophisticated about police prac25. Of course, all judicial fact-finding is to some extent vulnerable to the vagaries of a
swearing contest. But once the courts affirmed police authority to exclude any potential observer from the interrogation setting, the one-sidedness of the swearing contest in confession
cases could no longer be seen as fortuitous or inevitable.
26. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 509 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 578-80 (1961) (plurality opinion).
27. The argument is forcefully developed in Kamisar's Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and
Mansions ofAmerican Criminal Procedure. P. 27.
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tices and court procedures, easily dominated, or otherwise psychologically vulnerable were more likely to be on the losing end of a
successful police interrogation. Indeed even in theory, the voluntariness test favored the more sophisticated suspect because it probably
did not permit greater-than-average pressure against the strongerthan-average defendant. 28 The ·appearance of advantage for the
more sophisticated took on overtones of discrimination against racial
minorities or the poor. This discomfort with the voluntariness test
was sometimes mislabelled and too readily dismissed as an "equal
protection" claim,29 but the objection was not based on equal protection doctrine. Rather, the point was simply that we do (and should)
find it unseemly for government officials systematically to seek out
and take advantage of the psychological vulnerabilities of a citizen. 30
Whether or not one considers such tactics necessary for effective law
enforcement, they convey a feeling of manipulation and exploitation
of the weak by the powerful that many would tolerate with at best
considerable reluctance.
6. Physical brutality was not adequately checked. Of course, the
voluntariness test prohibited physical violence and other extreme
forms of abuse. But by permitting the use of "some" pressure, this
approach encouraged the questioning process itself. Indeed, while
courts occasionally mentioned a preference for evidence produced
"by the independent labor of [police] officers,"31 the voluntariness
test reinforced the idea that an effective police officer is one who
succeeds (by "fair" means) in obtaining a confession from the suspect. Unfortunately, after several hours of questioning, "slowing
mounting fatigue does . . . play its part"32 in weakening the officer.
His will - to comply with the law - may be "overborne" by impatience, frustration, or the persistence of a stubborn suspect who refuses to "come clean." It should not have been surprising that
sincere, dedicated investigators, intent on solving brutal crimes, occasionally lost their tempers. 33
* * *
28. See pp. 23-24.
29. See J)evelopments in the Law, Confessions, 19 HARV. L. REV. 938, 1018 (1966).
30. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,455 (1966) ("Even without employing brutality
. . . or the specific strategems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation • • •
trades on the weaknesses of individuals.").
31. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582 (1961) (plurality opinion).
32. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959).
33. q. 8 J. WrGMORE, EVIDENCE 309 (3d ed. 1940) (''The exercise of the power to extract
answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful
process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physicial force and torture.").
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The shortcomings of the voluntariness standard are of more than
merely historical interest for two reasons. First, that standard remains the principal basis for adjudication in various confessions situations not governed by Miranda. 34 Second, and perhaps more
important, law enforcement authorities continue to press vigorously
for the overruling of Miranda; 35 though a majority of the present
Court seems unprepared to take that step yet, the Justices' perceptions of the usefulness of the due process test undoubtedly condition
their willingness incrementally to expand the domain of that test by
very restrictive interpretations of Miranda.
The re-publication of Kamisar's early articles on the voluntariness test is therefore timely, and his work on that subject can usefully
be compared to the new crop of due process proposals generated by
the Court's evident discomfort with Miranda. Professor Joseph
Grano, in a particularly thorough study, has probed the difficult conceptual foundations of voluntariness discourse and has identified
several elements that courts should highlight in a sensitive due process analysis. 36 Such studies are extremely useful, but insofar as they
propose a return to exclusive reliance on the voluntariness test, conceived primarily as an individualized balancing of competing interests, they fail, in my judgment, to come to grips with the central
defects of that approach. Such proposals largely ignore the importance, for effective law enforcement as well as for the accused, of
providing clear guidance to the police. They bypass the difficulties
of "the swearing contest," downplay the manipulation of the weak,37
and overlook the dangers of encouraging actual physical abuse of
suspects.
Professor Grano's study does argue directly for the use of significant interrogation pressures and for the feasibility of judicial review.
But even his comprehensive analysis seems to leave a great deal unsaid concerning these problems. To assess the permissible degree of
pressure, for example, Grano develops a test cast in terms of whether
a person of ordinary firmness would yield to the pressures deployed,
34. See text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
35. q. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,438 (1977) (Black.mun, J., dissenting) (noting that
petitioner and 21 states and others, as amici curiae, had urged overruling of Miranda).
36. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law ofCo,!fessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979).
37. Grano, for example, recognizes that some personal characteristics of suspects must be
considered, but also emphasizes that since the objective of interrogation is to overcome unwillingness to speak, not every weakness can be taken into account. Id. at 901. He concludes that
physical or mental illness and extreme youth or old age should be considered, but that "social
adversity, peculiar personality traits, abnormal temperament, or low intelligence" should not
be considered: "We expect an individual to overcome these conditions or characteristics." Id.
at 904.
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and proposes that cases be judged in terms of what "[o]ur common
experience tells us"38 about the effect of interrogation pressures on
the average person. 39 Unfortunately, Grano's standard of "ordinary
firmness," though imaginatively patterned on the law of duress and
not transposed without caveats,40 seems much more misleading than
helpful in the confessions context.41 And the "common experience"
of most judges, lawyers, and law professors will seldom give them a
feel for the impact of persistent questioning in a custodial environment. A balancing analysis structured in this way cannot provide a
principled means to gauge the pressures deployed or to evaluate on a
case-by-case basis how much pressure should be constitutionally acceptable.
Sanguine predictions for the reliability of judicial review under
the new voluntariness proposals suffer similar shortcomings. They
are not buttressed by live examples from recent litigation, and they
simply do not square with the sad lessons of actual experience with
the ostensibly objective analysis of the pre-Miranda standard. Even
in close confessions cases where a conscientious court legitimately
could rule either way, the voluntariness standard impaired sound judicial administration: it prevented appropriate appellate control of
the trier of fact, and at best left an appearance of inconsistent, un38. Id. at 898.
39. See id. at 896-99.
40. See id. at 899, 906-07.

41. Reference to the "ordinary firmness" standard in the law of duress conceivably might
suggest either: (I) a benchmark against which to judge the allowable quantum of pressure;
(2) a framework for structuring moral discourse about the pressures one can be expected to
resist; or (3) a source of evidence that such a standard is not too elusive for satisfactory administration. Grano explicitly disclaims the first suggestion, id. at 899, and rightly so: in substantive criminal law, even threats of substantial bodily harm may be insufficient to establish a
duress defense, particularly when the charge is homicide. The third suggestion is untenable
because the open-ended duress standard is intended for application by juries on an ad hoc,
intuitive basis; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), forecloses that method of adjudication
for confessions claims.
The second suggestion is the most plausible, but it is nonetheless flawed. In the substantive
law of duress the standard of "ordinary firmness" prescribes a moral norm: one ought to resist
certain pressures because the failure to do so causes harm to other people. As a result, the
analysis of what one ought to do, though informed by perceptions about average capacities,
can be rooted in comparisons of relative harms and available alternatives. This kind of moral
discourse is wholly out of place in a voluntariness analysis. To speak of"the effort and resistance that reasonably can be expected of suspects in custody," Grano, supra note 36, al 907,
overlooks the absence of any moral notion that one ought to resist, in the interests of society, or
that one who fails to resist should be condemned for an antisocial act. From a social viewpoint
the suspect should confess; he is not expected but rather entitled to resist, and ordinarily he
does resist at the outset. We do not have a coherent moral notion of what it would mean to say
that the suspect was ''unreasonable" when he ceased his resistance and confessed. (From his
own point of view, of course, a suspect's decision to confess to the police is always unreasonable.)
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principled decision-making.42 Moreover, the problems of effective
judicial control were by no means confined to the close cases, as numerous truly shocking decisions attest. Lengthy confinement incommunicado, for example, is mentioned by Professor Grano as a factor
that would strongly suggest involuntariness under his analysis. He
cites .Davis v. North Carolina 43 and several earlier cases as confirming examples.44 But Kamisar provides a careful review of the litigation history of .Davis, showing that before the Supreme Court
reversed Davis's conviction, the North Carolina courts, the federal
district court on habeas, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit all had held that the confession in this capital case
was not involuntary (pp. 43-44, 73-76). And .Davis was far from an
isolated example. To choose just one other, let me avoid the South
and pick on my own home state, where in the Kern case a Pennsylvania appellate court held voluntary a confession obtained after
interrogators forced the suspect to strip naked. 45 Grano points to
this factor as one that also would strongly suggest involuntariness
under his approach. 46 Indeed, as early as 1945 the Supreme Court
had roundly condemned the tactic in Malinski v. New York. 47 Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania court never referred to Malinski, and the
opinion explained the voluntariness finding only in a brief passage
so mind-boggling48 that the reader can scarcely believe it was written
only eighteen months before the Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois. 49 Unlike .Davis, Kern was not a death penalty case
(the robbery conviction merely yielded Kem a sentence of not less
than seventeen years nor more than thirty-seven years), and both the
Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Courts denied review.
Conceivably, such miscarriages of justice would be less likely to42. See text following note 22 supra.
43. 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
44. Grano, supra note 36, at 908.
45. Commonwealth ex rel Kern v. Banmiller, 187 A.2d 185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 852 (1963).
46. Grano, supra note 36, at 908.
47. 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945).
48. It is true that the F.B.I. officers stripped Kern of his clothes in making a search of
him immediately after being taken to the police station. This was testified to be standard
practice and the reasons given therefor. It is not denied that after this took place, Kern
was permitted to put on his underwear, and it was in this condition that the statement was
obtained. Counsel for Kern now contends that this was psychological coercion. Amazingly, Kern himself never referred to this as being a cause for giving or signing any alleged confession. The officers testified that there was no beating and abuse . . . .
Commonwealth ex rel Kern v. Banmiller, 187 A.2d 185, 190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 852 (1963).
49. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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day. The Supreme Court now believes that, at least in search-andseizure cases, judicial insensitivity to constitutional rights is largely a
thing of the past. 50 In confessions cases it is much harder to say
whether such attitudes have changed, because Miranda has displaced the voluntariness analysis in the most frequently litigated situations. Several important differences between search-and-seizure
litigation and confessions cases suggest the need for caution before
concluding that state courts would apply an open-ended voluntariness test in the appropriate spirit. 51 Indeed, among the relatively few
voluntariness cases still litigated, there are enough contemporary
horribles to suggest that the problems of effective appellate review
remain acute.52 The claim that a due process approach can provide
50. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976). For discussion of the applicability of Stone to Miranda claims, see text at notes 102-20 infra.
51. Among the many possible areas of difference, two particularly worth exploring are
judicial attitudes toward the underlying right and the clarity of operative legal principles. On
the first point, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure has been recognized in principle
at least since Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914) (first applying the exclusionary rule in the federal courts). In contrast, a suspect's
right to terminate a custodial interrogation was not recognized even in theory until Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and understanding of the nature and importance of this right
may not yet have penetrated the judiciary to the same extent as understanding of the fourth
amendment.
The second point is much less speculative. Fourth amendment jurisprudence has long
since diverged from weighing the totality of the facts to determine whether a search was "unreasonable." q: Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 432-35 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's refusal to follow the lower court's use of the totality of the circumstances test). Because the governing rules usually leave appellate courts free to render judgment de novo, the doctrines permit effective control over the trial bench, where concern about
the crime and corresponding insensitivity to constitutional rights are likely to be greatest. The
voluntariness test, in contrast, is much more closely tied to a factual assessment. The trial
court's finding on the ultimate issue plainly is reviewable, but when an evaluation of the particular defendant's subjective state of mind is central to the mixed issue of fact and law, the
reviewing court will (and ordinarily should) defer heavily to the trier of fact. The ensuing
difficulties for a conscientious reviewing court are vividly illustrated by Commonwealth v.
Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662,335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976). See note 52
infra. In practice, inadequate sensitivity to constitutional rights at the trial court level is much
more difficult to identify and to remedy in voluntariness cases than it is in search and seizure
cases.
52. State v. Taylor, 112 Ariz. 68, 537 P.2d 938 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976),
involved a sixteen-year-old suspect who apparently had not gone beyond the eighth grade and
whose intelligence was described as "borderline." In connection with an investigation of a
hotel fire in which 28 persons died, Taylor was arrested at about 2:30 a.m., given his Miranda
warnings, and then questioned continuously for seven hours by a team of nine interrogators.
He made a series of confused and inconsistent statements which were later introduced against
him, leading to conviction on 28 counts of first-degree murder. The Arizona Supreme Court
held the statements voluntary, explaining that "we are impressed by the fact that despite this
alleged overwhelming atmosphere, the appellant never confessed to anything. He continued
through an ever changing pattern of fabrications to protest his innocence ..••" 112 Ariz. at
81, 537 P.2d at 951.
Co=onwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
959 (1976), involved a murder suspect who was kidnapped by four relatives and friends of the
victim, driven to a secluded hunting cabin and severely beaten. Beginning at 6:00 a.m. the
next morning, he was interrogated continuously for over six hours and was repeatedly
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"a workable and effective means of dealing with confessions in a
judicial manner" 53 is no more plausible today than when Kamisar
wrote his caustic "dissent" from the Miranda dissents fifteen years
ago.
Kamisar's attack on the emptiness of the due process test no
doubt diverted his interest from the questions raised in his first article about how that test ideally should be interpreted. His failure to
return to that problem is nonetheless unfortunate, because even
while Miranda survives, its safeguards are simply inapplicable in
many important situations. These situations include police questioning of suspects not in custody54 and questioning by private parties
even when suspects are in a custody-like situation. 55 A Miranda
claim is also unavailable in certain significant procedural contexts,
even when the evidence involved is concededly the fruit of custodial
police interrogation.56 In all these situations, the primary criterion
of admissibility under current law is the "old" due process voluntariness test.
Because the due process test is still very much with us, Kamisar's
convincing demolition of it works one regrettable and undoubtedly
unintended disservice. Police Interrogation and Co,!fessions may
tend to reinforce impressions often conveyed elsewhere that Miranda
marked the death of the due process test and that, at least for the
threatened with death. Finally he admitted killing the victim and agreed to lead his captors to
her body. The trial judge found that the statements made in the cabin were inadmissible but
held that subsequent statements and actions leading to discovery of the body later the same
afternoon were voluntary because once the defendant had admitted his involvement, "a spirit
of relative friendliness supplanted the former hostile, strained relationships between the defendant and his captors." 368 Mass. at 672, 335 N.E.2d at 667. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed, relying heavily on its duty to abide by the trial judge's findings of fact;
although the defendant had testified that he made the afternoon statements unwillingly, the
trial judge chose not to believe this testimony. In one dissent, Justice Kaplan argued that the
trial judge's "finding" that by afternoon the defendant was "completely free from fear" was
"merely [a] reformulation in other words of the judge's conclusion. . . ." 368 Mass. at 706
n.2, 335 N.E.2d at 686 n.2 (Kaplan, J., dissenting). However, another dissenter, Justice Hennessey, viewed Justice Kaplan's approach as intruding on the trial court's prerogatives to appraise witness credibility and attempted instead to argue for reversal on a burden of proof
theory. See 368 Mass. at 727-28, 335 N.E.2d at 697-98 (Hennessey, J., dissenting).
See also State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977), revd sub nom. Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
53. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).

55. E.g., Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 959 (1976), discussed in note 52 supra. The "private party" exception is sometimes
extended to private security guards who act in a semi-official law enforcement capacity. E.g.,
Schaumberg v. State, 83 Nev. 372, 432 P.2d 500 (1967).
56. E.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statement elicited in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach the defendant's trial testimony).
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time being, it remains buried. 57 Careful attention to the voluntariness issue remains an imperative, though sometimes overlooked, obligation of court and counsel,58 and careful scholarly attention to the
voluntariness c_ase law that has developed since 1966 is long overdue.59

B. The Ff/th Amendment
The crux of Miranda was not so much the now-famous warnings
but rather the Court's holding that: 60
· all the principles embodied in the [Fifth Amendment] privilege apply
to informal compulsion exerted by law enforcement officers during incustody questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings
into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected
to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise
than under compulsion to speak . . . .61

From this premise the Miranda Court proceeded to articulate the
safeguards necessary (at least in the absence of equally effective legislative remedies62) to dispel the inherently compelling pressures of
custodial interrogation and to assure respect for the suspect's fifth
amendment privilege. Before any questioning, the Miranda Court
held, suspects must be warned about their rights to remain silent and
to consult counsel. If a suspect indicates a desire to remain silent
57. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 36, at 863. The leading casebook discusses the content of
the voluntariness test only as part of the historical background of Miranda and does not present any judicial opinions applying the test. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MooERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 543-665 (5th ed. 1980).
58. A recent example is United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980). The defendant
had barricaded himself in a motel room and threatened that he would not surrender peacea•
bly. While 25 to 30 officers surrounded the motel, an F.B.I. crisis negotiator allempted to
persuade the defendant to surrender and in the process obtained incriminating statements. A
Miranda claim was rejected because one judge found no "custody" and a second found no
"interrogation." Both views are based on particularities of Miranda's rationale and would by
no means preclude a voluntariness claim. Yet the defense never argued, and so the court never
considered, whether the statements made by this psychologically distraught suspect, on the
verge of suicide, in the course of a three-and-one-half hour conversation under highly charged
circumstances, were admissible under the due process test.
59. Aspects of the post-Miranda voluntariness problem have been explored in White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979), and in Dix, Mistake,
Ignorance, Expectation ofBenefit and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 275.
60. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
61. With this step the Court made a definitive break with the doctrinal and conceptual
premises of the due process approach. Although the fifth amendment language of compulsion
is not obviously different from the due process conception of "overbearing" the will, the reliance on the fifth amendment implied that the need for effective ways of obtaining statements
and the need to avoid overreaching the suspect could no longer be seen as equally important
concerns. Instead, by viewing the problem in fifth amendment terms, the Court made clear (at
least in principle) that protection against compulsory self-incrimination was not to be balanced
against other legitimate social interests.
62. 384 U.S. at 444, 467.
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("in any manner, at any time"63) then all questioning must cease. If
a suspect chooses to speak, the state bears a "heavy burden" of proving that the suspect ".knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel." 64
Miranda was, of course, sharply condemned by law enforcement
officials. The civil liberties community, by and large, welcomed the
decision as a major victory. 65 Kamisar's first response noted that
some aspects of the decision would have to be clarified (p. 42), suggested that the Court had perhaps gone too far in one respect, 66 and
concentrated its fire on exposing (with great force and effectiveness)
the many inadequacies in the dissenting opinions. But how much
had Miranda actually accomplished? To what extent had it solved
the specific problems that made the voluntariness approach so unsatisfactory? It is of course much easier to answer these questions now
than it was in 1966, but some serious shortcomings should have been
apparent from the outset.
On the plus side, Miranda certainly provided plenty of guidance
for the police. There was some potential ambiguity at the fringes of
"custody" and "interrogation," but the Court had taken a big step
toward clarifying the ground rules of permissible interrogation. Miranda's guidance also largely eliminated factors that, under the voluntariness approach, produced situations conducive to actual
brutality. 67 Moreover, Miranda eliminated, at least in principle, the
due process test's built-in conflict between the police officer's duty to
obtain a statement and his duty to respect the suspect's constitutional
rights: the Court emphatically commanded the police to cease all
questioning at the first sign of any desire to remain silent. The conflict, of course, persists below the surface because the officer will
want to obtain a statement, but at least the Court tried to tell the
police what, in theory, was expected of them.
It is more difficult to find virtue in Miranda's response to the
problems of appellate review under the voluntariness test. Of
63. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
64. 384 U.S. at 475.
65. Several ACLU lawyers objected that Miranda had not gone far enough, because it did
not mandate the presence of counsel. See pp. 47-49 n.11.
66. See pp. 42-43 n.2 (questioning the Court's failure to differentiate between stationhouse
interrogation and "custodial" questioning in the field or in the squad car).
67. Of course, neither Miranda nor any other approach can render defiance of the law
impossible. The most elaborate rules, even if complemented by thorough recording procedures, probably cannot prevent use of the rubber hose "off camera." But Mir_anda outlawed
the interrogation dynamics that easily lead to brutality; the voluntariness approach did not.

880

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 79:865

course, the new questions about whether "custodial interrogation"
had occurred and whether proper warnings had been given were
much more focused than the voluntariness inquiry and did not invite
a balancing of subjective attitudes about the need for vigorous law
enforcement. But the issue that normally arises next - whether a
proper waiver had been obtained - was destined from the beginning to be at the heart of the system of safeguards, and here the
Court simply reintroduced, in slightly modified form, the inquiry
into "voluntariness." The Court provided a few pointers,68 but the
issue was defined primarily in terms of an unfocused assessment of
the suspect's subjective state of mind under all the circumstances. As
a result the Court not only left itself at the mercy of lower courts
unsympathetic to constitutional safeguards, but more important, it
failed to provide the many conscientious appellate judges with the
framework for principled adjudication that had been lacking under
the due process approach. 69
How did Miranda contribute to reducing the amount of permissible interrogation pressures? In theory the opinion promised a great
deal. Any custodial interrogation, no matter how brief or polite, was
held to involve excessive pressure unless the suspect had received the
Miranda warnings and had knowingly waived his right to remain
silent. Moreover, the Court's safeguards (or any legislatively
designed substitutes) were to be "adequate ... to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings." 70 Given the premise - essential to the Court's holding and, in my view, convincingly
documented - that extremely strong pressures are inherent in the
custodial atmosphere, the remedial medicine obviously would have
to be potent. Was the Court's prescription adequate to the purpose?
By proclaiming that the suspect has rights that will be respected, the
Miranda warnings probably do reduce in some measure the intimidating tone of the interrogation proceedings. Yet when the suspect,
though hopefully not yet "subjected to the techniques of persuasion," remains "swept from familiar surroundings . . . , surrounded
68. The Court stated that evidence of threats, trickery, lengthy interrogation, or incommunicado incarceration would suggest that a waiver was illegally obtained. See 384 U.S. at 476.
69. The Court did offer one point of departure for the waiver analysis by referring to the
standard for '·knowing and intelligent" waiver of the right to counsel under Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). But the analogy
quickly broke down, and it may have been inevitably destined to do so because of critical
differences between the rights being waived. The Court itself insisted, for example, that
"[v]olunteered statements of any kind are ... not affected by our holding. . . ." 384 U.S. at
478. As a result, the "right to remain silent" quite clearly could be lost inadvertently or unintelligently, and the right to counsel analogy was rendered inapplicable.
70. 384 U.S. at 458.
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by antagonistic forces," 71 and particularly when the all-important
warnings are delivered by those same "antagonistic forces," it is hard
to see how the intimidation can be reduced very much. Indeed, the
Miranda Court at one point seems to recognize as much, for in explaining the defendant's need for counsel the Court notes: 72
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate
very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators . . . . Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice
to that end among those who most require knowledge of their
rights. . . . Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own
attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process.
Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, n.5. Thus, the need for
counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not
merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but aJso to
have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so
desires.

Yet the Court implements this insight by merely requiring another
once-stated warning - concerning the right to counsel. The entire
passage just quoted collapses with the last five words, which condition the presence of counsel on the defendant's choice and assume
that this choice can remain "unfettered" even when it must be made
by an isolated defendant and then communicated to the very forces
whose hostility has created the need for the protection in the first
place. 73 The Court could have done much better by insisting on the
presence of an attorney during interrogation,74 or by requiring initial
consultation with an attorney or friend, or even by mandating that
warnings and waivers take place in the presence of a neutral magistrate who could break the wall of isolation and hostility surrounding
the suspect.75 The Court did not even mention these alternatives.
Miranda's promise for the weak and unsophisticated is closely
linked to its prospects for dispelling the pressures of interrogation.
By requiring that police inform all suspects of their rights, and by
making clear that indigents too were entitled to the assistance of
counsel (if they so desired), the Court went far toward correcting the
appearance that the poor and the unsophisticated were particularly
71. 384 U.S. at 461.
72. 384 U.S. at 469-70.
73. See pp. 92-93.
74. This was the position of the ACLU. See pp. 47-49 n.l 1. The argument was developed
in detail in the amicus brief filed by the ACLU in Miranda.
75. Under this last alternative the Court also would have had to bar any questioning of the
suspect before he receives the warnings in the magistrate's presence.
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vulnerable to police exploitation. The manner in which police could
deliver warnings and obtain waivers nevertheless promised that beneath the appearances, manipulation of the weak and vulnerable
might continue.
The subject of the "swearing contest" is saddest of all because
this problem was the central obstacle to effective judicial control of
the interrogation process. In Miranda itself the Court referred in
several places to the problem of secrecy in police interrogation. 76
The Court even purported to explain the suspect's right to counsel by
claiming that, among other things, an attorney's presence during
questioning would help provide a reliable picture of what had occurred during the interrogation.77 Yet Miranda does nothing whatsoever to mitigate the pitfalls of the swearing contest. The heralded
warnings need not be given by a disinterested person, and the Court
required no objective proof to corroborate claims that they were
given in proper form by the police. The defendant's decision to
waive his right to silence need not be made before a disinterested
party or recorded in any fashion. Even the right to counsel, vaunted
by the Court as a safeguard against police fabrication, can be
"waived" by the suspect when he is isolated, in the privacy of the
interrogation room, with only the police as observers. The most that
can be said is that by requiring the prosecution to bear a "heavy
burden" of proving waiver, and by dropping a strong hint about the
State's ability to furnish objective corroboration,78 the Court was
perhaps laying the groundwork for tackling the swearing contest in
the future if police proved unwilling to take the hint. One has to
wonder, however, whether in seeking a truly effective package of
prophylactic rules, the Court should have started where Miranda
starts and postponed what Miranda postponed.
Kamisar probably would be the last person to deny these shortcomings. Yet his "Dissent from the Miranda Dissents" seems astonishingly circumspect about these matters. He relegates to a threepage footnote the complaints by a few civil liberties advocates that
Miranda did not go far enough and the early reports about the ease
with which police were obtaining waivers (pp. 47-49 n.11). His own
view was that "[t]he Miranda Court required enough things 'at one
gulp,' for me at any rate." 79 In his later writings, criticism of Mi76. 384 U.S. at 445, 448.
77. 384 U.S. at 470.
78. 384 U.S. at 475.
79. P. 49 n.11, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, S02 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring
and dissenting). Perhaps Kamisar wondered about the tactical consequences of a forthright

March 1981]

Confessions and the Court

883

randa becomes more explicit. Indeed the lion's share of two full articles is devoted to the all-important swearing contest. 8° Kamisar
vividly exposes both the obvious and the more subtle problems here
and shows how the difficulties could be avoided, without significantly impairing any legitimate countervailing interest. 81 Yet even
now Kamisar tends to be somewhat indirect in discussing Miranda's
other weak points, 82 while he chooses instead to stress the basic conceptual soundness of the Miranda approach. The most recent and
most substantial of all his confessions pieces, covering more than one
third of the book, is an extended criticism of the Court's choice of a
sixth amendment focus in Brewer v. Williams, 83 and a plea for
remembering Miranda, which "[w]hatever its shortcomings, . . .
tried to take the 'police interrogation'-'confession' problem by the
throat" (p. 223).
I am not so sure. Miranda undoubtedly serves important symbolic functions. It also affords certain concrete advantages over the
due process test, in terms of its guidance to the police, its partially
effective safeguards for the suspect, and its somewhat more focused
framework for judicial review. Miranda does not, any more than the
due process test, come directly to grips with the dilemma arising
from our simultaneous commitments to the privilege against self-inattack on the essential conservatism of Miranda. A demonstration that the Court really had
not changed ver:y much might have deflated the foolish, but politically consequential, 1968
outcry over "handcuffing" the police. But then, a forceful showing that Miranda's logic called
for much more than the Court had required conceivably could have heightened fears that
worse things were to come and thus strengthened the forces of political reaction. Perhaps
Kamisar worried too about the responsibilities of the scholar (the committed scholar) under
these circumstances. Most of us will be thankful that we did not face these dilemmas ourselves.
80. See Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a JJiscomjiting Record, supra note 3;
Kauper's "Judicial Examination ofthe Accused" Forty Years Loter, supra note 4.
81. Ironically, however, a requirement that all interrogation sessions be recorded (or even
that all "proceedings" be recorded, see p. 135) may be of little or no help in resolving the
particular issue presented in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the ver:y case Kamisar
uses to develop his point. The police probably cannot be expected to have tapes rolling at (and
before) the moment when a suspect unexpectedly "volunteers" information. If, as in Williams,
they contend that the statements were made in that fashion, they will for the same reason have
no tapes to produce; the question whether their failure to record was improper will tum on the
same unverifiable testimony as the question whether there was "interrogation" in the first
place. To make matters worse, the police may even point proudly to their failure to record as
evidence that no interrogation was intended. Of course, these ironies in no way detract from
Kamisar's basic point that when the police do intend to interrogate, the failure to make a
complete recording is indefensible.
82. Some problems arising out of Miranda's approach to waiver are mentioned, pp. 223,
303 n.472, with primary emphasis again on "swearing contest" problems. Kamisar directly
and forcefully addresses Miranda's failure to mitigate the pressures of custodial interrogation
in connection with the discussion of the Kauper proposal for formal interrogation by a magistrate. Pp. 92-93.
83. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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crimination and to a law enforcement system in which police interrogation is perceived as a necessity. If anything, Miranda's technique
for denying this dilemma, for insuring that we can have our cake and
eat it, is infinitely less candid than the due process balancing analysis
that Kamisar has justifiably attacked. Seen as a compromise, Miranda is weU worth retaining. Whether Miranda represents the best
possible compromise, and indeed whether compromise is required at
all, remain open questions. 84
C.

The Sixth Amendment

In Massiah v. United States, 85 decided two years before Miranda,
the Court held inadmissible certain incriminating statements obtained from an indicted defendant by an undercover informant. The
defendant was not in custody when the statements were made, he
was not even aware that he was talking to a government agent, and
he faced virtually no significant pressure to speak under the circumstances. Neither due process nor fifth amendment concerns could
justify exclusion of the statements. Yet six members of the Court, in
an opinion by Justice Stewart (who would soon dissent in Miranda),
held exclusion required by the different set of concerns underlying
the sixth amendment. The Court reasoned that after the initiation of
formal judicial proceedings (in this case by indictment), defendants
are entitled to a lawyer's help at every stage of those proceedings.
Because the government "deliberately elicited" incriminating information from the suspect in the absence of his attorney, it had defeated this right to assistance.
Massiah was soon overshadowed by the controversial Escobedo
and Miranda decisions and its potential was, as Kamisar puts it,
"lost in the shuffle" (p. 160). Recently, however, the Court returned
to Massiah in Brewer v. Wil!iams. 86 Williams involved a direct conversation between the police and a murder suspect who had explicitly and repeatedly invoked his rights to silence and to counsel.
Williams was arrested on murder and kidnapping charges, formally
arraigned, and then driven across Iowa in police custody. During
the ride Williams made incriminating admissions after a now-notori84. In a piece written four years before his plea for reinvigorating Miranda, Kamisar offered intriguing suggestions for modifying present fifth amendment restrictions on formal testimonial compulsion and for replacing the Miranda safeguards with a system of official
interrogation by a magistrate in the presence of counsel. Pp. 77-94. This approach, and particularly its capacity to satisfy the perceived "need" for confessions, seems well worth further
exploration.
85. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
86. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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ous "Christian Burial Speech," in which a police captain pointed out
the prospect of a heavy snowfall and stressed the danger that the
young victim's body might never be found and properly buried without prompt help from Williams. Because the captain had not asked
Williams any direct question (in fact he told Williams, "I do not
want you to answer me . . . . Just think about it. ..."), 87 the lower
courts had focused on the questions whether the speech constituted
"interrogation" and whether Williams had waived his Miranda
rights. The Supreme Court bypassed Miranda and held the statements inadmissible under the sixth amendment Massiah doctrine.
Why did the Court ignore Miranda and choose the Massiah
route instead? This question, which both perplexed and troubled
Kamisar, prompted the last and by far the longest of the pieces in
this b_ook. 88 In a penetrating examination of both Miranda and Massiah, Kamisar provides invaluable insight into the contrasting foundations and distinct limits of the fifth and sixth amendment
doctrines. Once more making brilliant use of numerous arresting
hypotheticals, Kamisar identifies two ways in which Massiah afforded an easier route to reversal than Miranda: (1) Massiah bars
e.fforts to "deliberately elicit" information by any strategem and does
not require "interrogation"; and (2) its basis in the sixth amendment
suggests that any "waiver'' of the right to counsel should be tested by
an especially stringent standard. Yet the Court made no reference to
either of these advantages in Williams. Instead, it characterized the
"Christian Burial Speech" as "tantamount to interrogation" 89 and
discussed the waiver problem in terms that would have been equally
suited to analysis of fifth amendment rights. Given the Court's treatment of the facts, reversal should have been a foregone conclusion
under Miranda. In light of other indications of the Court's lack of
enthusiasm for Miranda, 90 its avoidance of Miranda in the Williams
situation was "at least puzzling and at worst (for supporters of Miranda, at any rate) downright ominous" (p. 202).
Kamisar proceeds to show that anyone concerned about the potential evils of police interrogation could take scant comfort from the
revived status of Massiah. Although that doctrine is potentially
broader than Miranda with respect to the "interrogation" and
"waiver" problems, it is narrower in one crucial respect. Massiah
rights come into play only after the onset of adversary judicial pro87.
88.
89.
90.

430 U.S. at 393.
What is Interrogation?, supra note 2.
430 U.S. at 400.
See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99.
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ceedings. The Court has indicated that this does not occur merely
upon arrest; rather, some formal litigation event, such as indictment,
preliminary hearing, or arraignment seems to be required. 91
Kamisar offers a telling critique of this requirement92 and suggests
several less arbitrary ways in which an appropriate line could be
drawn, but concludes that the Court is committed to a relatively formalistic conception. As a result, law enforcement authorities may be
free to manipulate the events that trigger Massiah rights. And in any
event, the doctrine is simply unrelated to concerns about the fairness
of an interrogation or the potential for coercion which it may involve.93 The Miranda safeguards therefore remain essential to assure adequate protection for constitutional rights during police
interrogation.
We now know that fear of the imminent demise of Miranda was
premature. Without great enthusiasm, to be sure, the Court has explicitly reaffirmed Miranda ,94 and if the Justices still seem unlikely
to embark on vigorous expansion of fifth amendment requirements,
the Court probably will at least continue to tolerate Miranda's substance as it stands. 95 This is not to say that Kamisar's fears were
exaggerated. On the contrary, there is at least some evidence that the
Court's subsequent decisions reaffirming Miranda may in some
measure be ascribed to the simultaneously balanced and impassioned argument developed so convincingly in Kamisar's article on
91. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality opinion).
92. Pp. 210-24. Arguments in support of the formal line drawn by the Court are developed
in Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises l/nderl)'litg
the Law of Coefessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. I, 25-31 (1979).
93. Even after adversary judicial proceedings have begun, Massiah may afford a less satisfactory standard of judgment than Miranda. Because Massiah applies when the government
"deliberately elicits!' information, it has the advantage of making irrelevant the existence of
"interrogation" pressures or the suspect's perception of an official demand to speak. On the
other hand, the "deliberately elicit" test appears to make the governmental purpose critical;
since the defendant himself has no direct knowledge of this, the "swearing contest" may not
even be a contest. The Massiah standard may or may not be extended to situations in which
the governmental purpose is equivocal or impossible to prove, see United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264, 271 n.9 (1980); 447 U.S. at 277 n.• (Powell, J., concurring), but in any event the
subjective elements of the test aggravate problems of proof that are already considerable. In
contrast, the test of interrogation for Miranda purposes is essentially objective, see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-302 (1980). In practice the standard should prove somewhat
less vulnerable to the difficulties of the swearing contest. For a discussion of the Innis and
Henry decisions, see White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United
States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209 (1980).
94. See Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 471 (1980) (per curiam). See generally Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
95. See 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (''The meaning of Miranda has become
reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither
overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date.").
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Williams .96
There remains, however, one plausible (and potentially "ominous") reason, not mentioned by Kamisar, for the Court's preference
for the Massiah route in Williams. Massiah afforded one advantage
over Miranda, even on the Court's view of the facts, because Williams reached the Court in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding. That procedural point assumes importance in light of Stone v.
Powell,97 decided eight months before Williams. In Stone, the Court
had ruled that fourth amendment search and seizure claims may not
be raised on federal habeas corpus if the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim. Stone raised serious questions about what other kinds of constitutional claims
similarly might be held unavailable on habeas. In Williams, two
Justices mentioned the Stone problem, one in concurrence and one
in dissent, 98 and it must be said that neither Justice suggested any
reason for treating Massiah claims differently from Miranda claims
in the habeas context. Nevertheless, the status of Miranda claims on
habeas seems far more precarious under the reasoning of Stone. 99
The majority opinion in Williams omits any mention of Stone,
presumably because the parties had not fully briefed the issue, 100 but
it seems reasonable to speculate that at least some members of the
Court would have had difficulty ignoring Stone's implications, if reliance had been placed on Miranda . 101 The Court's decision in Williams to avoid that route thus could be read as darkening the shadow
cast by Stone over the continued availability of Miranda claims on
habeas. In any event Stone's independent implications are sufficiently serious to warrant separate consideration of the role of the
habeas remedy in an appropriate judicial response to the problems
of confessions litigation.
96, See 446 U.S. at 300 n.4.
97. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
98. Justice Powell, in concurrence, argued that the issue had not been adequately raised.
See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring). Chief Justice
Burger, in dissent, disputed this and, reaching the merits of the issue, concluded that both
Massiah and Miranda claims should be barred on habeas. See 430 U.S. at 422-28 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
99. See text at notes 109-19 infra.
100. See note 98 supra.
101. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977) (the Court indicated that if
necessary to the disposition of the case, it might have considered extending Stone to Miranda
claims, even though the prosecutor had not even raised the point).
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CONFESSIONS IN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS LITIGATION

Stone v. Powel/ 102 bears witness to the Court's desire to promote

more effective judicial administration by reshaping the machinery
available for the resolution of constitutional claims. In sharply restricting the availability of fourth amendment claims on habeas, the
Court proceeded from the premise that these claims, unlike many
other constitutional claims, "do not 'impugn the integrity of the factfinding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable;
rather, the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations ... .' " 103 The question therefore was whether the potential
for habeas relief in the federal courts would add measurably to the
deterrent effect of exclusion at trial or on direct review, and if so,
whether any such added deterrence would justify the costs incurred
in achieving it. In Stone the Court found "no reason to believe . . .
that the overall educative effect of the exclusionary rule would be
appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be
raised in federal habeas corpus review . . . ." 104 Moreover, the
Court stressed that the costs of exclusion were substantial, not only
because of the impact of the exclusionary rule on accurate fact-finding whenever it is invoked, but also because of "societal costs [that]
persist with special force" 105 in the habeas context:
Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure that no iru;1pcent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty,
results in serious intrusions on values important to our system of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the
minimization of friction between our federal and state systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which
the doctrine of federalism is founded." 106

The Court's search for manageable tools for adjudicating confessions claims inevitably will proceed beyond reexamination of interrogation doctrine to similar questions about the proper scope of the
habeas remedy in such cases. Yet, neither a due process claim nor a
sixth amendment Massiah claim could plausibly be excluded from
habeas under the reasoning of Stone. A due-process claim, unlike a
fourth amendment claim, ordinarily does involve a direct "challenge
102. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
103. 428 U.S. at 479 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969)).
104. 428 U.S. at 493.
105. 428 U.S. at 495.
106. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
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[to] evidence as inherently unreliable." Moreover, the Court had
held that use of an involuntary confession at trial impermissibly impairs the integrity of the judicial proceedings even if the confession
can be shown to be trustworthy. Thus in Mincey v. Arizona, 107 the
Court held that a reliable but involuntary confession (unlike reliable
search and seizure evidence) may not be introduced even for the limited purpose of impeachment. In light of decisions like Mincey there
is little doubt that the Court would (and should) regard a voluntariness claim as so central to the integrity of the judicial process that
habeas relief must remain open even after full and fair litigation in
the state courts. 108
A sixth amendment Massiah claim is only slightly more vulnerable under the reasoning of Stone. Admittedly, a Massiah violation
will typically cast no doubt on the trustworthiness of the defendant's
statements. Chief Justice Burger stressed this point in arguing in his
Williams dissent that habeas relief should have been denied whether
or not the Massiah claim was well-founded on the merits. 109 But the
Massiah "exclusionary rule" is not merely a prophylactic device; it is
not designed to reduce the risk of actual constitutional violations
and is not intended to deter any pretrial behavior whatsoever.
Rather, Massiah explicitly permits government efforts to obtain information from an indicted suspect, so long as that information is
not used "as evidence against him at his trial." 110 The failure to exclude evidence, therefore, cannot be considered collateral to some
more fundamental violation. Instead it is the admission at trial that
in itself denies the constitutional right. When the government has
made an "end run" around counsel, or effected pretrial discovery in
107. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
108. To the same effect is Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), where the Court refused to
extend Stone to a claim of grand jury discrimination. Such a claim casts no doubt upon factual guilt but still challenges the integrity of the proceedings in a fundamental way. Rose is
not completely dispositive, however, because a grand jury claim is by nature much less likely
to receive a sympathetic hearing in the state courts. See 443 U.S. at 563. See also Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977) (implying that Stone could not arguably be extended td a
voluntariness claim). A decision to the contrary would require overruling Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953).
109. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 425-26 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
110. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964). Although the Massiah rule does
not condemn post-indictment investigation as such, the decision does not necessarily authorize
post-indictment efforts to elicit information in all cases. Rather, the Massiah Court explicitly
limited its holding to the "circumstances here disclosed." 377 U.S. at 207. Since the defendant
was "part of a large and well-organized ring" of drug smugglers under "continuing investigation" by federal agents, 377 U.S. at 206, a particularized need for further information had been
shown. The Court in Massiah did not address the scope of permissible post-indictment investigation in the case of a defendant charged with a completed crime in which he apparently had
acted alone.
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disregard of the norms oflegitimate adversary procedure, it is wholly
beside the point to claim that the evidence obtained by such tactics
was reliable. Use of the evidence taints the judicial proceedings in a
fundamental way, 111 and relief on habeas must remain open.
Miranda claims seem much closer to search and seizure claims
for purposes of applying Stone and denying habeas review. Of
course, it could be argued that a Miranda violation poses a possibility of actual but unprovable involuntariness, and thus that Miranda
violations involve an unacceptable risk of untrustworthiness. 112 But
the Court has repeatedly rejected this view, holding in several different contexts that a Miranda violation does not, in itself, impair the
fact-finding process or in any other way impugn the integrity of judicial proceedings. 113 For example, a confession obtained in violation
of Miranda can, like search and seizure evidence, be used for impeachment purposes if its reliability is established. 114 Moreover, the
Court has repeatedly characterized Miranda as a set of prophylactic
rules designed to deter unacceptable police behavior and to reduce
the risk of actual constitutional violations. 115 Given the Court's assumption in Stone that habeas relief is not useful in furthering such
deterrence goals, the Court may consider the value of habeas relief
in Miranda cases to be similarly outweighed by its costs.
One major difference between Miranda claims and fourth
amendment claims nevertheless should lead the Court to reject this
analogy and to reaffirm the availability of Miranda claims in habeas
cases. In search and seizure cases, the only plausible constitutional
objection to the police behavior ordinarily must be based on the
fourth amendment. II6 By foreclosing such claims on habeas, Stone
makes a major contribution to the finality of litigation, helps conserve judicial resources, and reduces friction between state and fed111. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 556-57 (1977) (police undercover agent's participation in pretrial discussions between defendant and his attorney did not deprive defendant of
a fair trial, as long as no information obtained by the agent was communicated to the prosecutors).
112. See Note, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 138-39 (1966).
113. E.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (nonretroactivity of Miranda).
114. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
115. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44, 446-47 (1974).
116. A due process claim is extraordinarily difficult to establish in the search and seizure
context. Compare Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 164 (1952), with Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954). Such claims presumably remain open after Stone, although in delineating its
holding, the Court (perhaps inadvertently) stated that after an opportunity for full and fair
state litigation of a fourth amendment claim, federal habeas relief on grounds of "unconstitutional search or seizure" is precluded. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 494 (1976). Compare 428 U.S. at 495 n.37 ("we hold only that a federal court need not apply the exclusionary
rule on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim . . . .") (emphasis added).
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eral courts. 117 Extending Stone to Miranda claims will produce none
of these advantages, because a due process voluntariness claim necessarily will remain open to the habeas petitioner. Such an extension
of Stone would only shift primary attention at the habeas stage from
Miranda to the open-ended due process standard. Whether defendants or prosecutors would more often profit from this situation is
unclear, but principled decision-making and effective appellate administration undoubtedly would suffer. Indeed, the usual difficulties
of the due process approach probably would be compounded by an
extension of Stone. The shift of focus at the habeas stage from Miranda to due process would tend to impede reliance on findings of
fact in the prior state proceedings. 118 The voluntariness standard
also would require more frequent resort to relatively subjective, ad
hoc decision-making that would only enhance friction between the
state and federal courts. Ironically, the extension of Stone to Miranda claims would not even remove the Miranda issue from the
case, except in a purely theoretical sense: the habeas court still
would have to determine whether the interrogated suspect had been
warned of his rights, because such warnings are recognized as an
important factor in due process analysis of the totality of the circumstances.119
Thus the extension of Stone would provide no added measure of
finality to state criminal cases and would in the end complicate
rather than simplify the habeas litigation that would necessarily continue. An extension of Stone to Miranda claims therefore seems unwise even if the deterrent effect of habeas review is considered slight.
In habeas corpus as well as on direct review, Miranda remains useful
as a tool for manageably adjudicating constitutional claims in confessions cases.

III.

CONFESSIONS AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

Kamisar opened his first article on confessions with the observation that "[t]o discuss police questioning without knowing what such
questioning is really like . . . is playing Hamlet without the
117. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976).
I 18. See, e.g., Taylor v. Cardwell, 579 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1978).
119. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963); .Developments in the Law,
Confessions, supra note 29, at 981. Moreover, if warnings were not given, or given and not
respected, a habeas court applying a voluntariness analysis normally would even have to decide whether there was "custody" and "interrogation" within the meaning efMiranda, because
the failure of police to respect legal requirements is again recognized as an important factor in
the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 510 n.7
(1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
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ghost." 12° Few people have done as much as Yale Kamisar has to
bring us face to face with that reality. While Kamisar illuminates
the analytical complexities of confessions doctrine with far more
subtlety than most of the "legal minds" he loves to poke fun at, 121 he
also constantly communicates a vivid sense of the human drama behind the abstractions.
Nevertheless, after nearly two decades of rapid, ostensibly "revolutionary" legal development, the judicial doctrines relating to confessions still seem far stronger on form than on substance. Kamisar
justifiably lambastes Massiah as little more than a symbol, 122 but
much the same must be said of Miranda; neither one delivers even a
fraction of what it seems to promise.
What should one properly expect of the Court? One can fairly
question whether anything the Court might do in this area would
change the underlying social and political realities very much. But a
firm judicial determination to restrict interrogation severely or to
prohibit it altogether probably could be enforced. Would this really
be desirable? I am inclined to think that, given suitable alternatives
to police interrogation, 123 such a step could be worth its potential
costs, but it is easy to understand why fair-minded Justices might not
feel sufficiently certain about the consequences. The best of them
must feel sorely tempted to adopt a strong but largely symbolic
stance, without seeking to intrude very much upon the hard worlds
where investigators and high-volume penal administrators continue
to attempt their impossible missions.
If many of the Court's "reforms" are destined to be essentially
symbolic, we will need to develop a much better understanding of
how judicial reform functions on the symbolic level and how, if at
all, its impact ultimately is felt. For similar reasons, the significance
of judicial "retreat" may need to be assessed primarily from a symbolic perspective. Indeed, anxious hand-wringing over each new
technical loophole engrafted on Miranda by the Burger Court is, in
terms of Miranda's practical effectiveness, supremely beside the
point. Apart from their immediate consequences, however, such retreats convey a symbolic message of their own. The finer points of
respect for individual rights are necessarily disparaged, the distinction between the desirable and the constitutionally permissible is in120. P. I (quoting Weisberg, Police Interrogation ofArrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in
153, 155 (C. Sowle ed. 1962)).
121. See pp. 32, 56, 104.
122. See pp. 212, 223-24.

POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

123. See note 84mpra.
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evitably missed, and a certain amount of clear overreaching by
police and prosecutors is, in the nature of things, encouraged.
On the symbolic level, therefore, the Court has every reason to
continue operating on the "high ground" of concern for those individual liberties threatened by increasingly complex and powerful social institutions. The Court's symbolic steps, however piecemeal or
imperfect, may prompt the kind of comprehensive legislative response that, given the contemporary politics of crime control, is most
unlikely to emerge without prodding from the judiciary. In the long
run, the Court's efforts conceivably can help educate the thousands
of front-line officials upon whose voluntary and comprehending
compliance the constitutional order ultimately depends. 124 What the
Court needs to carry out its educative mission is the continued support of those clear voices that articulate the best aspirations of a free
society, that relentlessly expose the everyday world where those aspirations have yet to penetrate, and that constantly call upon us to
narrow the loopholes and exceptions that keep us distant from our
goals. Kamisar's voice is among the best of that essential breed.
124. q. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) ("[O]ver the long term, [the] demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is
thought to encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system.") (footnote
omitted). Of course, that process of reshaping values is exceedingly complicated, at best. See,
eg., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).

